Theoretical Angst and the Myth of Description by McNaughton, Patrick
ON "FIRST WORD," 
JANUARY 1993 
I read Don Cosentino's "First Word" and I 
was moved by it. I have asked similar ques- 
tions of Africa-and-the-world recently, not 
just in the area of arts but her entire cultural 
heritage. Some of my questioning has been 
motivated by the Martin Beral syndrome in 
our communities and schools, some by 
reflections in the commercial press like those 
in Time that Cosentino cites; but most 
poignantly by my return to Nigeria in 1991 
and again in January this year. My 1991 trip 
was my first since 1976-fifteen years' 
absence. And those were important years. In 
the mid-1970s everyone was looking forward 
to better times; now everyone has known 
better times. My 1991 experience was a sad 
one, my 1993 trip even sadder, as things are 
visibly deteriorating. 
And West Africa's and Nigeria's noble 
heritage (noble, and real, documented-damn 
it, as G. I. Jones said to an enthusiastic audi- 
ence of students at the University of Ibadan 
in 1954, we don't have to go to Egypt or even 
further, and wrestle with history, and specu- 
late; the complex, rich, sophisticated, glori- 
ous roots of West African and Afri- 
can-American culture are right here)...where 
is it? It's hard to find, and once found, it can 
be identified only by one who has had direct 
experience of a culture that lived it, twenty 
and more years ago; one cannot interpret it 
by reference to current popular sentiment. 
The exhibits in the National Museum and in 
the small museums in state capitals seem of 
some other world, not at all related to, or rel- 
evant to, this one. 
This is not dreamy nostalgia. The senti- 
ments expressed in the January "First Word" 
are important, very important. Cosentino 
speaks for a whole generation, on both sides 
of the Atlantic. I hope he is heard. I suggest 
his thoughts become the theme of a sympo- 
sium, the proceedings of which should then 
become a book. At least, I hope they stimu- 
late something, that they don't just get filed 
away with that issue. 
Phillips Stevens, Jr. 
State University of New York at Buffalo 
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...the beard-growers and gown wear- 
ers were judged for historical accuracy 
and for innovation and uniqueness. 
(parade Grand Marshal discussing 
Fourth of July festivities in 
Bloomington in a Sunday Herald-Times 
article by Kelly Rota) 
We want it clear, goodness knows, but 
we also want it thick, and we get the 
thickness in the human consciousness 
that entertains and records, that ampli- 
fies and interprets... 
(Henry James, The Art of the Novel: 
Critical Prefaces by Henry James, p. 256) 
Only shallow people insist on disbe- 
lief. You and I know better. We under- 
stand how reality is invented. A 
person sits in a room and thinks a 
thought and it bleeds out into the 
world. 
(Don DeLillo, Mao II, p. 132) 
In the sixties art history's emphasis on for- 
malism and artistic biography, with its 
attendant interest in connoisseurship, left 
Africanists wondering how the discipline 
could contribute to a humanistic understand- 
ing of art in the hands and the minds of peo- 
ple. We responded with a renewed and 
vigorous interest in the contexts of art, and 
studied those contexts with the same sorts of 
ethnographic approaches used by anthropol- 
ogists, ethnomusicologists, and folklorists. 
Now Africanists have a new kind of op- 
portunity. The ways we work place us in a 
position not occupied by other areas of art 
history, or other branches of the humanities 
for that matter. And I think that gives us the 
opportunity to establish a particular kind of 
usefulness for theory. 
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The broader field of art history has for the 
longest time been embroiled in a prickly 
debate about theory. The debate reached 
Africanist art history slowly, after a good 
many years of swirling about in other comers 
of the humanities-social sciences continuum 
such as anthropology and literary criticism. 
As recently as 1988 Norman Bryson made a 
comment that illuminates the situation. 
...the discipline of art history, having 
for so long lagged behind, having been 
among the humanities perhaps the 
slowest to develop and the last to hear 
of changes as these took place among 
even its closest neighbours, is now un- 
mistakeably beginning to alter. One 
index of change is the number of new 
journals that in the past ten years, and 
strikingly in the past five, have 
appeared on both sides of the Atlantic, 
journals that explicitly go beyond the 
discipline's status quo... 
(Bryson 1988:xiii) 
The debate focuses on the nature of the sta- 
tus quo, and it can be quite heated. A large 
number of non-Africanists rail vociferously 
against theoretical approaches to the study of 
art that go against what they consider to be the 
straightforward acquisition of facts, while 
another non-Africanist group views the first as 
dinosaurs incapable of interesting or useful 
research. These points of view can divide 
departments into political camps that battle 
stridently over such things as the kinds of 
graduate students that should be admitted and 
the kinds of guest speakers that should be 
invited. In other words both the day-to-day 
workings and the general character of depart- 
mental life are profoundly affected by these 
battles. The issues involved are no less promi- 
nent in many museums, where the nature of 
exhibitions like "The West as America" has 
been influenced considerably by particular the- 
oretical dispositions, and the controversy 
stirred up by the shows invokes battling theo- 
retical (and ideological) points of view. Dealers 
and collectors are also part of this debate over 
theory, and in the end what the public gets to 
see and read is very much affected by it. 
Nestled in between these lovers and haters 
of theory, Africanists often fall into a third 
group, one that has cautiously begun to apply 
theoretical points of view to the data gleaned 
from observation and description, and one that 
has also become increasingly sensitive to issues 
involving the nature of research and re- 
searchers. This middle ground holds a great 
deal of potential for study in the arts, because it 
offers opportunities to explore the usefulness 
of theory from vantage points that are more 
practical than the two warring points of view. 
But Africanists are also in another very 
interesting position, one that has to do with 
the nature of interdisciplinary approaches. 
We have rather different bedfellows from 
those of our non-Africanist colleagues. In fact 
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Africanist art history is by no means domi- 
nated by art historians, and it is not to be 
taken lightly that an art historian serves as 
curator at the National Museum of Natural 
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History and an anthropologist serves as cura- 
tor at the National Museum of African Art. 
When historians of Western art turn to the- 
ory, they most frequently seek camaraderie in 
the ideas of literary criticism, philosophy, film 
theory, art criticism, and psychoanalytic psy- 
chology. Good examples of this can be found 
in various recent publications that bring sever- 
al fields together. For example, Art after Mod- 
ernism: Rethinking Representation, edited by 
Brian Wallis in 1984, includes six art historians 
and seven art critics, three writers and three 
artists, three literary critics, two film theorists, 
one philosopher, and one sociologist. Visual 
Theory: Painting and Interpretation, edited by 
Norman Bryson, Michael Ann Holly, and 
Keith Moxey in 1991, includes seven art histo- 
rians, five philosophers, four literature schol- 
ars, one historian, one member of a psychology 
department, and one anthropologist. 
Most non-Africanist art historians travel- 
ing in fields outside their own favor what 
they seem to consider a natural kinship. They 
look to disciplines that emphasize the ab- 
stract analysis of things people make, with a 
certain deemphasis on people. 
Africanists, on the other hand, have for a 
good many decades been most closely aligned 
with anthropologists and sociologists (and to 
a lesser extent archaeologists, historians, and 
folklorists). We work more frequently with 
living art traditions, and so we work with 
people. Naturally, then, we tend to find inter- 
disciplinary camaraderie with researchers 
who also focus on people, and on the things 
people do with the things they make. In many 
ways this changes the emphasis and tone of 
the theoretical positions Africanist art histori- 
ans and anthropologists are inclined to devel- 
op, perhaps because we are more accustomed 
to considering the complexities and contradic- 
tions of actual human behavior. 
What Africanists Can Do 
If the work of broader art history aims to tell 
what art is really about and how it fits into 
culture and societies, then its findings must 
be compatible with what we learn about how 
people think and act. The theoretical perspec- 
tives that art historians are lately adopting 
must offer insights and avenues of approach 
into the minds and actions of people, as indi- 
viduals and in groups. More than any other 
segment of African studies, ours can produce 
research that will help determine that. 
But we Africanists have some work to do 
to enhance our capabilities. We have been 
slow to acknowledge the potential usefulness 
of theory, and a good many of us in fact still 
have not. And, like our Western-oriented 
counterparts, many of us have also failed to 
realize that observation and description are 
more than methodologies, they are theoreti- 
cal positions with serious consequences. 
In this column I want to consider two 
aspects of theory, from the vantage point of an 
Africanist who believes that all of our research 
is grounded in theoretical assertions and that 
we can put theory to positive use without 
becoming mindless converts to someone else's 
points of view. I will address the angst of 
scholars who insist theory is irrelevant, and 
the myth that observation and description are 
straightforward approaches to research. At the 
same time I will examine ways in which I 
think theory can help us develop a better 
understanding of the role of the researcher, 
the character of data, and the complex nature 
of human ideas and behavior. It will be obvi- 
ous that to some extent I am also criticizing 
Africanists, and where I do I do not exclude 
myself, because I have most certainly done 
plenty of the things I think we should forego. 
Assertions and Fictions 
We can identify status quo scholars in the 
broader byways of art history as those who 
adhere to four principal assertions. First, they 
proclaim-stridently or demurely-that art 
history should avoid theoretical approaches to 
examining artistic phenomena, because theory 
is just a collection of other people's ideas, 
which will act like screens that twist and 
skew any information passed through them. 
Second, they construe our most pertinent 
information to be the product of careful obser- 
vation and description of artistic (and social) 
phenomena. Third, they assume we are capa- 
ble of discovering vantage points within soci- 
eties from which we can observe and describe 
objectively. Fourth, they proceed as if it is tac- 
itly obvious that what we should and can 
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observe and describe are the rules and norms, 
the shared beliefs and practices, that we imag- 
ine glue a society together and generate the 
meanings and uses of artworks. Such rarified 
materials as those allegedly provided by 
Marcel Griaule's legendary Ogotommeli are 
interesting but of little use to us, because they 
do not represent what groups such as the 
Dogon really think, or at least what we as- 
sume most Dogon really think. 
Each of these assertions contains some 
truth. For example, certainly it is important to 
try in every way possible to be perceptive and 
accurate, impartial and thorough, and certain- 
ly we must do all we can to understand the 
artistic and social ideas that people in a soci- 
ety share. But each of these assertions is also 
fictitious; or, more accurately, each perpetu- 
ates a fiction that weakens art history's work. 
Angst about Theory 
The first assertion, that theory is dangerous, 
has become highly contentious and volatile. 
At every conference, at every meeting of 
minds-at every opportunity-many art his- 
torians seem intent upon bashing any col- 
league who might attempt a move into those 
troubled waters where scholars engage the 
issues and ideas that populate the multiple 
realms of theory in the humanities and social 
sciences today. Any colleague who might 
suggest we ought to stop wading and start 
swimming risks becoming the subject of mis- 
trust and ridicule. 
We have all sorts of ways to abuse theory. 
We can assess it as trendy and ephemeral, as 
a convoluted mess of verbal gymnastics that 
the self-proclaimed elite of academe invent to 
create their own secret societies and get a lot 
of grant money, leaving the real world to us 
plain-talking, straight-shooting regular work- 
ing stiffs. 
There is certainly some truth in that assess- 
ment. Often enough as we read through the 
decon-post-praxis-subjectivist-semio-potpourri 
(it's a jungle out there), we encounter what 
seems for all the world to be just adventures in 
poetry or academic wish fulfillment. 
Sometimes it even seems like hogwash. And 
frequently, depending on what version or 
author you read, theories, from post-structural- 
ism to reader-response, seem to be common 
sense writ outrageously complex and reified. 
Why dignify such stuff? Why slog through 
its jargon and why try to assess the usefulness 
of applying such will-o'-the-wisp fabrications 
to our materials? 
There are at least two good reasons. First, it 
is wise to know what the competition is doing, 
what the big scholars (like the "Big Men" in 
New Guinea) are thinking and how they are 
expressing their thoughts. The nature of 
academe is discourse-the exchange of ideas, 
and their examination, synthesis, and evalua- 
tion in the face of what we think we have 
found in the world. When we refuse to read 
theorists or entertain their suggestions, we 
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diminish ourselves while remaining unable to 
refute them in any justifiable or reliable way. 
Second, the value of theory does not reside 





get our interpretations of data right. Some 
scholars might choose to adopt another schol- 
ar's system of analysis and collection of 
assumptiorts, but there is absolutely no need 
to do so. After all, theories are collections of 
ideas that other individuals have assembled 
and refined on the basis of their experiences 
and contemplation. Why should they neces- 
sarily apply to the area or the art you seek to 
understand? One of the most interesting theo- 
rists working today, Anthony Giddens, states 
that theory conceived of as broadly applicable 
laws and generalizations is a notion of rather 
limited use (1984:xviii-xx). And we often see 
that the devotees of any particular theory, the 
followers who apply someone else's work to 
their own material with too much gusto and 
not enough reflection, are frequently the 
authors we find most dogmatic and least use- 
ful. Theory swallowed whole is the formulaic 
denial of thought, and it is one of the worst 
things we can do to understand human 
minds, social groups, and art. 
But theory can be the opportunity to gain 
perspectives and insights, and the chance to 
see if they might not suggest a means by 
which we can understand better some aspect 
of art with which we are struggling. I don't 
see why we should ask anything more of the- 
ory, or why that would not seem valuable 
enough all by itself. 
I am entertained but not certain of the 
value rendered in the infinity of nuances 
Michel Foucault articulates to tell us about his 
view of signs and their transformations in sev- 
enteenth-century Europe (1973:46-76). I am 
impressed with Laura Mulvey's renowned 
indictment of the politics of Western male 
pleasure in the cinema, but not convinced that 
the image of women as the threat of castration 
can ever play a big role in my thinking, or is 
even that powerful an explanatory principle 
for exploring cinematic sexism (1975:6-14, 
17-18). I am intrigued to read that post-struc- 
turalists such as Jacques Lacan moved beyond 
existentialism's interest in the individual as a 
conscious actor to posit that there is no separa- 
tion between the self and society and that peo- 
ple are constituted by language (Sarup 1989:7). 
But I will not incorporate such an idea into my 
own work, because my experiences with 
Mande and with art lead me to think that it 
leaves out the crucial aspect of who composes 
society and creates the meanings we share or 
transform with language, and that it misun- 
derstands the nature of thought and action, 
and constrains our understanding of history. 
I am not anxious to struggle through the 
multiple works of Giddens, to sort out all the 
ways he obscures or contradicts himself, 
making life complicated for readers. But I am 
interested in the essence of Giddens's idea of 
structuration, which is his assessment of how 
people use rules and materials (be they con- 
crete or conceptual) to create the things we 
sometimes call social formations: things such 
as religious institutions and their multiple 
components, things such as sculptures and 
clothes, and things such as the systems of 
interpretation local people or researchers cre- 
ate to evaluate artworks or activities. The 
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more I think about my experiences with 
Mande people, the more I think I can adapt 
(slant, twist, transform) many aspects of 
Giddens's structuration theory to examine 
and perhaps understand how Mande use 
form and aesthetics in their lives. 
I am also interested in examining Gid- 
dens, for example, against the other scholars I 
find helpful, to see how they might support 
one another on various themes and issues, 
and to see if there are things they all discuss, 
each from their own vantage points and 
experiences, that could be synthesized and 
adjusted to give me more purchase in under- 
standing why and how people use art. Like 
other scholars, I have puzzled and wondered 
and worried over the things that art can be 
and do. So I add my own ideas to those I read 
about and consider the effects they have 
upon each other. That, in a nutshell, is how I 
use theory. And I will go further and say I 
think that is how we all should use theory. 
Myths about Description 
Now we come to the second, third and fourth 
assertions I introduced above: that observa- 
tion and description generate straightforward 
and accurate information; that objective van- 
tage points can be obtained for such proce- 
dures; and that rules, norms, consensus and 
shared beliefs and practices should constitute 
the core of that description. While there is 
value and veracity in these assertions, they 
are not simple truths or common-sense pro- 
nouncements about good research. Rather 
they are theoretical presumptions, assumed 
positions, hypothetical assertions that weave 
a theoretical web around the practice of our 
discipline. And often the people who make 
these assertions most central in their work or 
proclaim their value most vociferously to 
their colleagues are the same people who 
take the greatest offense to what they consid- 
er the insolence of blatant theorists. In other 
words they blind themselves to the theoreti- 
cal nature of their own approach and fail to 
recognize its limitations and liabilities, while 
HEADDRESS insisting that other people's theories are 
Ogoni, Nigeria wrong-headed or overbearing. Is there not 
Height: 24" something paradoxical in this? 
We can explain the paradox ironically by 
referring to theory, specifically, the idea of 
naturalizing ideologies; that is, the idea that 
people grouped into collectives (from small 
ones such as Elks lodges, Komo associations, 
or Africanist art historians, to large ones such 
as the American middle class or Bamana 
Muslims) share collections of beliefs and 
activities that serve to reinforce the notion 
that other of their beliefs and activities are 
natural, normal, and simply the way things 
should be. The exploitation, destruction, and 
conversion associated with Europe's colonial- 
ization of African peoples were justified 
through naturalizing ideologies that asserted 
a superior, more enlightened civilization for 
Europeans and then concluded that it was 
only natural for such favored creatures to 
rule the world's less favored ones. 
The three assertions we now discuss have 
been crafted-by happenstance, accident, 
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and design-into naturalizing ideologies for 
mainstream art historians. These scholars do 
not question their validity or see them in the 
light of Western intellectual history. Instead 
they just accept them as fact, as natural ways 
for researchers to work, as self-evident truths 
involving the ways people think and act, and 
the ways we can know how other people 
think and act. 
These assertions might even seem refresh- 
ing in the face of much of art history's own his- 
tory. In Rethinking Art History Donald Preziosi 
made the theoretical nature of our discipline 
his point of departure for exploring and cri- 
tiquing the field. But we should not need any- 
one to tell us our field is theoretical. From its 
wellsprings to its more recent practitioners, art 
history has been awash in theoretical assump- 
tions and propositions. Read any section of 
Michael Podro's The Critical Historians of Art 
(1982), for example, or read Keith Moxey on 
Panofsky (1985), or Arthur Danto on Moxey, or 
E. H. Gombrich on Ernst Kris and Otto Kurz 
(1979), and the theoretical backbone of art his- 
tory becomes absolutely clear. To scholars of a 
phenomenalist bent, stepping back from deep 
theory to the seemingly more direct and posi- 
tivistic activity of "objectively observing and 
describing rules and norms" could be like par- 
ticipating in a bracing rite of spring. 
But it only appears to be more direct and 
objective. The problem is that these three 
assertions are grounded in a whole slew of 
additional assumptions, such as: the way to be 
objective is to record things meticulously, or 
(for non-Africanists) written documentation 
can be taken as truth, or (for Africanists) if you 
are careful people will tell you the truth, or the 
vested interests of art users and art researchers 
are obvious and easily taken into account, or 
what we see and what people tell us are all we 
need in order to understand social, intellectual 
and psychological phenomena. If I ask gradu- 
ate students to reflect on their experiences in 
life, and then consider these assumptions in 
light of those experiences, they invariably find 
the assumptions unrealistic, even peculiar. Yet 
we all know colleagues in colleges and muse- 
ums who just cannot view them as anything 
other than obvious truths. 
Of course we can and do observe and 
describe-things, situations, events-we do it 
all the time. We are in fact so accustomed to 
these second-nature activities, upon which so 
much of our everyday discourse rests, that 
we rarely think about the assumptions or the 
implications of their enactment. Furthermore, 
our mainstream American styles of socializa- 
tion as well as many of our post-Enlight- 
enment public ideologies encourage us to 
presume that the products of observation and 
description will by and large be representa- 
tive of the real world. We observe, we de- 
scribe, and life proceeds as if we were doing 
something right. Why, one of Western civi- 
lization's most cherished and idealized forms 
of enterprise, science, is often said to be 
grounded in these acts. 
But the assertion that information is rea- 
sonably generated by observation and 
description bears a fiction that we can jettison 
just by considering what Michael Baxandall 
says about a relatively basic kind of descrip- 
tion, that of a painting, a material object in 
space (1985:1-5). To describe an artwork you 
must first formulate and focus your thoughts, 
and as soon as you do that you bring your 
experiences and interests into play. The 
description that results may well generate 
visions in listeners, but it probably will not 
allow them to visualize the actual artwork. 
That is true even of straightforward 
descriptions. Baxandall suggests that descrip- 
tions of artworks are representations of 
thought about having viewed the objects 
described, and if you have ever asked stu- 
dents to describe museum pieces you know 
this to be true. Even trained and seasoned 
describers of objects bring their own interests 
and experiences to bear on the task. And so 
they make choices that influence the descrip- 
tion and make basic accuracy a rather shad- 
owing, relational thing. Thus observation and 
description are not simply common-sense 
tools for the acquisition and presentation of 
information. They are proclamations ground- 
ed in the theoretical assertion that what we 
can see and hear and report on with these 
techniques are the appropriate and important 
information of art history. 
The experiences of Africanists make it 
harder to see description as straightforwardly 
informative and uncontentious. While an 
object in space would seem to be a compara- 
tively easy thing to describe, how can we 
construe the idea of accuracy in descriptions 
of social actions or interpretations of mean- 
ings in symbolic forms? Those kinds of 
events combine and compound the interests 
and experiences of at least two parties, and 
the thing being described may not actually 
even be wholly visible to the observer. 
Here the full panoply of human aspira- 
tions, ideologies, expertise, and access come 
powerfully into play. When art is busy being 
used, bearing a load of function and meaning 
for people who have put it to work, the situa- 
tions in which the art is invoked and all the 
indigenous decisions that inform it constitute a 
complex event. How can those situations be 
observed accurately, and how does one 
observe anything but the tangible physical and 
social artifacts of thought, evaluation, and deci- 
sion-making? Here accuracy becomes emphati- 
cally perspectival, and the only way our 
descriptions can be useful is if we acknowl- 
edge and explore the perspectives at play. But 
all too often these events are described as if 
they were almost mindlessly simple, and emi- 
nently subject to our shrewd powers of obser- 
vation. Such description assumes accuracy to 
be a virtual given, and proceeds from there to 
ignore much of the conceptual complexity and 
ambiguity that give artworks and art events a 
substantial amount of their richness and utility, 
to say nothing of their efficacy and power. 
Art history's manner of putting observa- 
tions together into descriptions often leads to 
Continued on page 82 
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sionally. But when we did I would spread pil- 
lows on the floor and settle in for an hour, for 
an hour and a half, for the spring that would 
be visited upon me as we talked and thought 
about what each of us had new to offer. I'm 
looking out my study window now, in the 
full beauty of a southern Indiana spring. 
There are reds and yellows and greens and 
whites all across my field of vision. Lovely 
little cardinals keep flying in front of me. 
There is a beech tree just beyond some ever- 
greens and my fence. It is still mostly branch- 
es without leaves, but it is radiating bright 
solidarity and a special kind of grace. And 
I'm thinking of the place where what I have 
become began. I'm thinking of Sylvia and 
how we've all lost her. 
Now, in my own Indiana spring, as I 
drive the country roads that take my sons to 
school, through purples and pinks and the 
strange, beautiful songs of woodpeckers; 
now, as I pass by the quiet tree-ringed waters 
of the little lake where I sometimes fish and 
think-in the midst of these things Sylvia 
glows like the trees I see, and I wish I could 
talk to her again. I wish I could tell her what 
she was to me. 
Sylvia wrote a travel book. I wonder how 
many people know that. It is called West 
African Travels: A Guide to People and Places, 
and it takes you to an Africa that she invent- 
ed. It is an Africa crystallized momentarily 
from her experiences and her intelligence. It 
is a collection of places full of romance and 
wonder, poignancy and power, thoughtful- 
ness and introspection. It is a place very 
much like the place another wonderful per- 
son who has died created, the Mande singer 
and philosopher Seydou Camara, a person of 
thought and awe like Sylvia, who used to use 
his art, as Sylvia did, to try to make other 
people smarter. That shimmering, mindful 
Africa is the place I tell my students to go, a 
place to find yourself. A place to grow. 
Sylvia wrote another book, supposedly as 
an art historian. But categories like that 
should often be broken, and her book be- 
comes a strategy. It shows how ideas can be 
strung together and laced to make a way of 
seeing and of being in the world worthwhile. 
It is a vision momentarily crystallized from 
Sylvia's experiences and her intelligence, and 
you can think about the parts that affect you 
the most and put them to work for you. She 
would have loved that. 
Sylvia overflowed with marvel. And she 
was intense in so articulate a way that you 
were hard pressed not to be affected by her. 
Sylvia was a person of dignity and intelligence. 
She was seclusive and did not impose herself 
on you. But the people she touched know 
more of life because of her, know more about 
themselves and about what we all could be. 
More people like Sylvia in this world, 
many more people like Sylvia, would make it 
a better place. Sylvia made it a better place. 
There is a hole in the world when some- 
one like Sylvia leaves. There is a hole in me. 
Patrick McNaughton 
generalizations, and the theoretical underpin- 
nings of this approach assert that generaliza- 
tions are a proper means of understanding. 
To some degree they are, but they have seri- 
ous limitations and can in fact lead to pro- 
found misunderstanding. I can expound all I 
want on the general meanings and functions 
of the Mande Komo association and its mas- 
querades, and so can the Mande who talk to 
me about them. I can talk about clarity and 
obscurity as general principles of Mande aes- 
thetics, and be to some degree correct 
(McNaughton 1979, 1982a, 1982b, 1988). Such 
generalizations are useful, but they can be 
ignored or even abused by artists and clients 
who choose to do so, and that very clearly 
constitutes another significant form of useful- 
ness that I need to consider. Generalizations 
about Komo are also useful. But they are also 
just fodder for the actual Komo leaders and 
dancers and general membership in each 
branch, who will stage and interpret specific 
performances on the basis of their interests, 
experiences, and the nature of the situation 
that has inspired the performance. Thus gen- 
eralizations are conventions, or guidelines, 
parameters, points of departure that have 
been established historically and will be eval- 
uated and quite possibly transformed as each 
performance becomes a part of Komo's histo- 
ry. I need to remember and acknowledge that 
when I generalize about Komo. 
There is much Mande evidence that cor- 
roborates the need to treat generalized 
descriptions as partial and contingent. Years 
ago Charles Bird noted that expert bards, the 
poet-historians of Mande, break the aesthetics 
and poetics of their profession quite purpose- 
ly, and pronouncedly. That is what you do 
when you're good (Bird 1976, especially p. 91). 
Mary Jo Amoldi's forthcoming book on youth 
association masquerade performances makes 
this same sort of point: masks and puppets are 
flexible vehicles whose specific meanings and 
uses are adjusted to specific situations. 
Generalized descriptions that neglect those 
adjustments and situations will miss much of 
what makes art a part of life, and much of 
what makes art important. Barbara Hoffman's 
dissertation describes at length a specific bard 
event in which an especially important rule 
(generalization, convention, parameter, guide- 
line) of performance behavior was literally 
trashed. That rule, the proceedings that 
abused it, and the activities that resulted from 
the abuse are each important, and together 
present a scenario that indeed involves human 
aspirations, ideologies, expertise, and access in 
a complex web that was both subtle and bold. 
Because art, thought, and social life are so 
intimately intertwined, this particular event, 
richly examined by Hoffman, demonstrates 
the serious limitations of other scholarly 
works that are grounded in the assertion that 
information is composed of straightforward 
observation and description. Had Hoffman 
been content to use that assertion, and will- 
ing to use other scholars' generalizations 
about bardic events, she likely would have 
concluded that the event she observed had 
gone dreadfully wrong and was a bad exam- 
ple of its genre. Or she would have had to 
describe the event as an anomaly, with no 
better way to understand it. But Hoffman 
went beyond the event's description, giving 
us the opportunity to see how rules and 
expectations, goals and consequences 
impinge upon one another in complicated 
orchestrations that make life interesting. 
Hoffman's, Aroldi's, and Bird's work on 
Mande take us past basic observation and 
description. They offer richer, more insightful, 
more accurate and useful information by pro- 
viding deeper levels of description that involve 
careful analysis and the very judicious use, 
here and there, of what mainstream Africanists 
would call theory. Yes, they observe and 
describe, but they do so in a sophisticated way 
that involves several levels of engagement. 
Yes, they offer generalizations, but they are 
generalizations that penetrate the often mis- 
leading surface of events and objects, to arrive 
at a level of analysis that offers more explana- 
tive power. While denying the potential of the- 
ory and failing to realize that observation and 
description are theoretical approaches, far too 
many scholars remain right at the surface of 
what they seek to understand, and end up pro- 
moting a great deal of misunderstanding. 
I have talked to scholars whose own work 
does not address these complexities, not that 
everybody necessarily should. But sometimes 
they suggest that the people they study are 
just not like Mande: their society is simpler, 
more conservative, less subject to internal 
discourse and disagreement, more fixed, less 
prone to associating artworks with multiple 
agendas. That may well be true, and I am not 
in the best position to judge. Yet the same 
kinds of things were said about Mande soci- 
eties before careful researchers began to 
scratch beneath the surface impressions 
gleaned from straightforward observation 
and description. So when scholars say the 
society they work with is simpler or more 
rigid, I wonder if perhaps it isn't the method 
of examination that is simple or rigid. 
This is much like the issue of a word for 
art. For the longest time scholars insisted that 
Mande were far too practical to have a word 
like our word for art. Then in southern Mali 
Kate Ezra noticed Bamana elders discussing 
art with the phrases mafile fen, fleli fen, and 
laje fen, which mean "something to look at" 
or "something to see." Ezra notes that these 
words "convey the idea that art, for the 
Bamana, is something that attracts your 
attention, focuses your eye, and directs your 
thoughts" (1986:10). 
This is significant, because so many schol- 
ars still recite what has become a kind of 
maxim asserted by outsiders about Africans, 
that they unlike us treat what we call art as a 
functional part of life, and so naturally have 
no special word that isolates it for contempla- 
tion. The degree to which this assertion mis- 
understands both African and Western art is 
staggering. Quite possibly it emerges from 
the observation and description approach, 
with its attendant limitations. 
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The very idea of art is complex and diffi- 
cult to communicate (witness all the West- 
ern worry over how one defines the word). 
It is deeply grounded in the ideologies and 
practices, the contradictions and tensions, 
that constitute the ways societies do busi- 
ness. To expect a word like our word "art" 
to emerge directly or easily from cross-cul- 
tural observation and description is like 
looking at the outside of an automobile and 
expecting to understand the systems inside 
that make it move. 
To understand the working parts you have 
to look into nooks and crannies, and you also 
have to know how to do things like unlock the 
hood. Art history's prominent use of observa- 
tion and description has often resulted in a 
kind of complacency about how hard re- 
searchers must look and how much research- 
ers must analyze. Many would deny this, but I 
think that it's true. Like the more universally 
acknowledged forms of theory, observation 
and description lull users into thinking they 
are getting the job done without putting much 
effort into reflection and analysis. 
Embedded in the assertion that observa- 
tion and description generate unencumbered 
data is the assertion that objective positions 
are available from which we may exercise 
our need to observe and describe. Available 
where, and how can we find them? Such 
scholars as Paul Stoller (in Stoller & Olkes 
1987:9-11) have pointed out that informants 
are quite capable of lying, often for reasons 
we will not readily suspect or comprehend. 
And given all I've said above, I cannot think 
that objectivity will reside in the minds of 
carefully trained and responsible researchers. 
Michael Jackson puts it nicely when he notes 
in his introduction to Paths Toward a Clearing: 
"It is likely that 'objectivity' serves more as a 
magical token, bolstering our sense of self in 
disorienting situations, than as a scientific 
method for describing those situations as 
they really are" (1989:3). His introduction, 
and most of the book, provides example after 
example of this fact, while Johannes Fabian's 
Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes 
Its Object (1983) helps show how objectivity 
in our kind of work is really a theoretical 
assertion grounded in the intellectual and 
colonial history of the West. 
Annette B. Weiner demonstrates the rela- 
tive and relational nature of objectivity in a 
wonderfully circumspective way, by compar- 
ing her own research efforts with the 
Trobiand Island people of New Guinea to 
those of Bronislaw Malinowski (1988:1-9). 
Anita Glaze's work on Senufo woman power 
in the arts is equally enlightening, as she 
notes that "from the literature one would 
think that Senufo art is essentially a man's 
world" (1975:26), when in fact it most certain- 
ly is not. 
The books that account for their authors 
in the midst of research make excellent read- 
ing in this regard. From the insightful early 
work of Elenore Smith Bowen (Laura 
Bohannan) to the more recent but equally 
valuable volumes by Carol Spindel, Paul 
Stoller, Alma Gottlieb, and Philip Graham, 
these works show the interactive and ever- 
changing perspectives created in research 
environments. Just the list of players is 
impressive: artists, dancers, cult administra- 
tors, local cultural affairs officers, art traders, 
town chiefs, senior cult members, neophytes, 
elder members of communities, yeyes (what 
Malians used to call hip young people whose 
personal images were stylized "antitradition- 
al"), and researchers. And each of these char- 
acters possess expectations and aspirations, 
expertise and competence, allegiances and 
commitments that come into dynamic play 
whenever the researcher talks to someone or 
tries to watch something. 
Where in all that dynamic, contentious 
space are there places for us to create objec- 
tive vantage points? And what resources 
could we possibly use to create them-our 
neutral, level-headed training received from 
detached advisors amicably situated in the 
politics-free environments that are our uni- 
versities and museums? Jackson makes the 
point that "concepts do not transcend this 
life-world," and that is as true of the theoreti- 
cal constructs that assert the objectivity of 
observation and description as it is of those 
that proclaim the virtues of post-structural- 
ism or reader-response criticism. Jackson 
goes on to say that concepts "cannot get us 
above or outside experience, only move us 
from one domain to another, making connec- 
tions" (1989:20), and that is as true of people 
as it is of ideas. People, even researchers, are 
situated in specific space and their own par- 
ticular histories, and the variables that stem 
from such situations can be shockingly pro- 
nounced, given the assumptions we humans 
make about the shared experiences that allow 
us to be social beings. 
Objectivity is a noble idea, but it can 
never be a fact of life. To be sure, there is 
nothing more important than our responsibil- 
ity as researchers to be as perceptive and 
accurate as we can possibly be. But part of 
that responsibility is to be aware of and 
explain our particular situatedness, every 
time we do research and every time we write 
it up. Then our readers can assess our work 
and the art it focuses on, and furthermore 
gain some purchase on the kinds of situations 
that can envelop encounters with art. 
That is as true for non-Africanists work- 
ing in libraries, archives, and museums as it 
is for Africanists working in the savannah or 
the forest. We should ascertain and state 
what motivates our angles of approach. And 
we should ascertain and state to the best of 
our abilities what has motivated our sources 
to speak or write as they have. I think every 
art historian, Africanist or non-, has much to 
gain from reading Ivan Karp and Kent 
Maynard's analysis of scholarly interpreta- 
tions (1983), and Karp and Martha Kendall's 
examination of research reflexivity (1982). 
That leads us to the fourth assertion I 
identified above, that we should seek norms 
and rules in our quest to understand the arts. 
Once again, there is a fiction involved. 
Norms and rules can be effervescent and eas- 
ily transmuted by the people living them; 
moreover they are easy to invent or overap- 
ply. Pierre Bourdieu likens the predicament 
of researchers working in foreign cultures to 
people who "lack practical mastery of a high- 
ly valued competence and have to provide 
themselves with an explicit and at least semi- 
formalized substitute for it in the form of a 
repertoire of rules" (1977:2). 
This strikes me as a most profound assess- 
ment. We did not lear to speak our native 
tongues or walk by following a carefully pro- 
scribed and systematic set of rules. We were 
simply submerged in needs, desires, and 
opportunities that led to our acquisition of the 
skills. That is even true, though less pro- 
nouncedly, for most of our adventures in 
learning to drive cars, manipulate word pro- 
cessing programs, or even speak second lan- 
guages. Certainly we followed rules and 
systems that were offered as reasonable means 
to acquire these skills. But we internalized 
those skills, made them ours, by experiencing 
and mastering the confluences and contingen- 
cies of rules colliding with the worlds in 
which the skills are used. In short we leared 
best by doing, and that is also how we deeply 
leared our social skills and our knowledge of 
art. We may speak of rules, guidelines, rec- 
ipes, and formulas when quizzed by foreign 
researchers, but those schemata are most often 
far more prominent in the minds of our 
inquisitors than in our own. 
That kind of learing-using and doing- 
ultimately leads to a facility and confidence 
that moves rules and norms into the back- 
ground, or specifically tags them as elements 
to be manipulated; they become a part of 
something much broader, less fixed and 
more amorphous than you might think when 
you read about Dogon social organization, 
for example, or the aesthetic principles of 
Mande sculpture. 
For Africanists the notion of gerontocracy 
is a classic example. Who has not read that in 
this African society or that, the oldest person 
rules, be it a head of household or a town 
chief. Yet when you go to that place to do 
your own research, you find that this com- 
munity chief is not the old fellow who was 
theoretically positioned for the task, and that 
family leader is the wrong age or the wrong 
gender, but seems to be doing the leading 
nevertheless. Often students respond to such 
situations by trying to figure out what went 
wrong. Ah, that is evidence of the breakdown 
of local norms under modem, Western pres- 
sures, someone might say, but it is wise to 
think twice before accepting such assess- 
ments. Better perhaps to recall the adage 
from our own neck of the woods that says 
rules are made to be broken. 
The question then arises: which is more 
important to know, the rules or the ways 
people live them? In Mande aesthetics, 
should I focus on the norm about animal 
necks in sculpture, or on the individuals who 
put people's conception of the norm to the 
test by making animal necks very long, or on 
the responses people have to normal necks 
and long necks? In Mande symbolism, 
should I focus on the general cognitive and 
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emotional implications of animal horns in 
sculpture, or should I focus on the very dif- 
ferent things horns will be to: an experienced 
herbal doctor, a hunter, a town leader who 
knows an ample amount of sorcery, a town 
leader who knows no sorcery, a young fellow 
soon to be initiated into Komo (where mask 
horns just don't get any bigger), and a youth 
association member who dances a horned 
mask that satirizes Komo? 
I do not think you can reasonably answer 
one or the other. Many people everywhere in 
the world simply accept norms as the ways 
things should be done. But many people 
everywhere also defy, manipulate, and trans- 
form them for all kinds of interesting reasons 
and with all sorts of important skills and 
capacities. Equally significant, many people 
won't change them, but will contemplate the 
rules and norms they encounter in their lives, 
and that contemplation is an important part 
of living and thinking with art. Art, after all, 
is a significant form of thought, and if 
researchers ignore thought they run the terri- 
ble risk of beginning to see people as mind- 
less automatons. From my perspective, when 
that happens I wonder why one would want 
to study art at all. 
Komo masks are one of my favorite things, 
because they seem so loaded with contradic- 
tions. They are supposed to be exceptionally 
(you could say excessively) powerful and 
scary, but association members are quite will- 
ing to evaluate them in terms of their beauty. 
They are visually reduced configurations, sub- 
tracting essences from animals and recombin- 
ing them in sculpture. At the same time they 
are conceptually complex configurations, 
bringing together those visual essences with 
the essences of many medicines and natural 
forces to create complicated fields of energy, 
intention, and contemplation. 
I was always thrilled as a young disserta- 
tion researcher to learn how mushy and un- 
stable Komo rules and norms were. The mask 
should look like this, but here is one that 
looks like that. Meetings should be now, but 
instead they are then. Sacrifices should 
be...well, it just depends...on circumstances. 
Leaders should be Bamana, but here is one 
who is Fula, for God's sake, which is to say, 
not even Mande. 
How did I know Komo rules and norms? 
Partly because I read them in all that French 
colonial and anthropological literature, and 
partly because Mande told me them. So they 
were, but they weren't. They could be fol- 
lowed. Or they could be neglected. They 
could be used as social resources to garer 
authority. Or by breaking them they could be 
used as social resources to garer authority. 
Komo leaders and mask dancers could 
become famous by following the rules, or by 
not following the rules. It's not that rules and 
norms aren't there. It's that they have a sub- 
tler status, subtler meaning, than our fre- 
quent over-emphasis on them suggests. 
Our discipline's quest for rules and norms 
(criteria of taste, authenticity, stylistic attribu- 
tions, etc.), comes at the expense of people 
living them. Museum collections are populat- 
ed with conventional pieces, at the e 
interesting pieces that seem to dive 
style central. This has surely led to s 
poor assessments and no small ai 
impoverished data on what art in li 
like. And it has certainly contribut 
dubious assessments we still hear, f 
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African societies are conservative, r 
mutable only under unusual circur 
or when Islam or Europeans arrive 
their largesse. 
Such research behavior is as like 
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scholarly approaches we have branl 
blatantly theoretical. The point is tl 
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STOLEN ART 
The following objects were stolen, ti 
1987, the second in 1991: 
1) Side-blown trumpet. Sierra Leon 
bly Sherbro. Ivory (yellowish-li; 
approximate length 24" (61cm). Fl 
main body, incised decoration ai 
blow hole. 
2) Elephant. Dan, Liberia/C6te 
Wood, approximate length 12" (30.5< 
brown with red highlights, gloss 
Wooden tusks are nailed separately 
ears are incised. 
Please contact Blake Robinsol 
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ADAMS: Notes, from page 43 
[This revised manuscript was accepted for publication in 
February 1993.] 
rom non- I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the 
bout how Fulbright Commission for a research award (1989-90). The 
thesis of this article was first presented in a paper at an 
rigid, and African Studies Association panel in 1988. Much of the data 
nstances was first documented in my unpublished research journals 
of 1985 (nos. 5, 12) and 1989-90 (nos. 21-28). All statements to spread made by residents of Canton Boo and quoted or para- 
phrased in this article were first recorded in those journals. 
1ly to dis- For recent helpful criticism I thank Joan Bamberger and two 
anonymous reviewers. 
ny of the 1. For example: on house painting, Courtney-Clarke (1986, 
ded most 1990); on Kuba textile decoration, Meurant (1986); on calabash 
ornamentation, Chappel (1977); and on personal adornment, hat main- Fisher (1984). 
chosen to 2. One study of calabash use and decoration (Berns & 
Hudson 1986), while not presenting gender as an issue, pro- :ions over vides a good deal of information about women's roles and 
)f the the- women's arts. 
3. Another survey conducted in 1948, confined to eastern 
Liberia, includes the illustration of numerous wall paintings 
e, our job without indicating whether men or women painted them 
ilytical as (Holas 1952:415-37). 4. The French colonial administrative authority became 
ly the sit- effective gradually in the 1920s, although some sectors were 
the situa- still under military surveillance in the '30s. 
ho make 5. Amid laughter, some women recited a maxim that a man vho make who climbs to the attic granary gets his buttocks struck by 
ich atten- his wife's cooking ladle. 
we also 6. On rare occasions, Boo men add designs to the house 
walls. These are more likely to be human figures, animals, or 
ions, our occasionally an image or simply the name of Mammy Wata, 
of view, a water spirit invoked for good fortune. 7. For a description of pottery making in this region, see d art and Schwab (1947:131-34, fig. 63 a-e). His comments are based 
S. on his 1927 travels in northeastern Liberia among the 
Gbunde, Loma, Mano, and Gio (Dan); he included the Guer6 Naughton in Liberia, whom he called the Tien after the name of the 
University main town near the border of C6te d'Ivoire. 
ed, page 88 8. Schwab mentions that Dan women did not want to part , page with their prized pots (stored for festival use) because "no 
more like them were available" (Schwab 1947:131). In 1990 
I also heard this kind of remark, which seems to be a way 
m !:. - i
? of phrasing admiration rather than a report on current lack 
of talent. 
9. Poeh said potters followed two restrictions to avoid break- 
age: "Don't go near your husband (i.e., no sexual relations) 
and never use metal tools in the work, even to dig out the 
UI^^^B ~clay" (Adams 1989-90, no. 26:97). Among the half-Grebo, who are closely mingled with the Tien or southern Guere, 
Schwab also notes the potters' avoidance of men before 
beginning their work (1947:131). 
10. Large wooden containers for festival use are carved by 
men. The bowls are blackened and decorated with an 
arrangement of incised designs that closely resembles 
women's pottery. I believe pottery is the earlier model, as 
incised curvilinear zigzags are suited to working on clay sur- 
faces, not wood carving. 
11. One woman expert (Plon-Zo) who performs the opera- 
tion and another knowledgeable elder said that in addition 
to making the girls pretty, painting their faces changed their 
usual aspect (jeui zaa, to ritualize), showing that the girls had 
been transformed by initiation (Adams 1991b). 
12. Bohumil Holas's 1957 article on girls' initiation among the 
Oubi in the nearby Tai region indicated that initiates received 
the names of animals whose movements they conveyed in 
their dances at the coming-out ceremony. In 1992, at my 
request, Leonie Bonn6hin, a W6-speaking botanist working in 
the Tai region, obtained the names and animal roles of the 
initiates in Figure 12, all but one of whom survive. Zebahi 
Agnes, head of initiation camp, is the first woman on the left 
in the back row; the names of the other instructors in cotton 
he first in dresses are not known. Back row, left to right: Fahe 
Catherine, Buffalo (Dyi); Di6hi, Mask (Gla6); Degnan, Drum- 
mer (Koutehe); Pehi Cecile, Elephant (Do6). Front row, left to 
Le, proba- right: Dazahon Therese, Leopard (Dji); Oulai Gouley, Angry Ram (Tehe blae); Ouly, Lamb Pursued by Leopard (Bla6 
ght tan), Djouhou); Gnenonkongue, Monkey (K6ep). 
luting on 13. This spelling of the term is improved from woodhoe, 
t tip and which I used in an earlier publication (Adams 1986:54). 14. The division of responsibilities between male and female 
domains paired with claims of uniquely male leadership 
d'Ivoire. and control is encountered in many societies; this asymme- 
try appears natural by suppressing awareness of the inher- 
cm). Dark ent contradiction. 
y patina. References cited 
to body, Adams, Monni. 1991a. "Formal Public Titles for We/Guere 
Women, C6te d'Ivoire," Anthropos 86:463-85. 
n 649 C. Adams, Monni. 1991b. "Celebrating Women: Girls' Initiation in Canton Boo, C6te d'Ivoire," L'Ethnographie (Paris) 86, 2: 
C., 20003; 81-115. 
Adams, Monni. 1989-90. Research Journals 21-28, Canton 
Boo, C6te d'Ivoire (unpublished). 
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AD VERTISER INDEX 
Cavendish (1586), and the Cumberland expedition (1586). 
10. Presents were exchanged between Fenton's expedition in 
1582 and an African chief called Fatima. These included the 
gift to Fenton of an "elephant's tooth" (Donno 1976:197). For 
the use of ivory horns by chiefs in Sierra Leone today, see 
Henggeler 1981:59-63. 
11. The absence of carved lugs for the attachment of a chain 
or carrying strap would also indicate that it was not intend- 
ed for a European client. 
12. It is curious that Sloane himself makes no mention of the 
copper mounts in his catalogue description of the horn. 
Could he have been responsible for adding them? Or did he 
ignore them as obviously a later addition? 
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